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the "growthn case using simulation techniques. 
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A NON-EQUILIBRIUM EVOLUTIONARY 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
by Robert U. Ayresl and Katalin ~ a r t i n i i s ~  
Abstract 
Modifying some of the canonical assumptions of general equilibrium theory, in this paper we 
derive a computable economic progress function Z for any economic unit (EU) with bounded ratio- 
nality (BR). The progress function depends only on the internal economic state of the unit, as 
measured by possessions: goods, money and (for individuals) the value of future labor and leisure. In 
the absence of depreciation and aging the progress function is non-decreasing. It does not presume 
utility maximization or general equilibrium. Thus, the underlying theory is essentially in the 
evolutionary tradition. 
Arguments are presented for interpreting the progress function a s  a stock of economically 
useful information. 
Introduction 
There are good arguments to suspect that the economic system evolves irreversibly, in some 
sense, at the macro-level. Not only is this notion consistent with the second law of thermodynamics 
[Georgescu-Roegen 711; it is also suggested by the analogy with biological evolution that has been 
noted a number of times [Faber & Proops 86; Ayres 88bI. Finally, it makes strong intuitive sense that 
economic progress should follow in parallel with the irreversible increase in human knowledge, 
especially technology. 
However, the foregoing notions of macro-irreversibility are limited in their applicability to 
micro-economics. Indeed, micro-economics at present is basically a timeless, static, equilibrium theory 
in which irreversibility plays no central role. We believe, that it should play such a role, as we argue 
hereafter. 
There is another type of micro irreversibility in economics; namely, the irreversibility of 
pairwise exchange transactions [Martinh 891. This follows from the condition that no economic agent 
will undertake an economic activity leaving himher less well off. This is essentially bounded 
rationality (BR) - sometimes called satisficing - in the sense of Herbert Simon [Simon 55, 59, 821. 
In terms of transactions in the market domain the argument is simple: In the first place, if A is willing 
to trade apples for oranges with B, A will not be willing to trade in the reverse direction (oranges for 
apples). He does not trade for the sake of trading. In the second place, the trade will not take place 
unless both A and B are better off in their own terms. This is essentially a restatement of Edgeworth's 
first principle of economics: "Every agent is actuated by self-interest" [Edgeworth 81 p.161. 
1 Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA..USA, and the International Institute of Applied System Analysis (IIASA), 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
Roland WOS University, Budapest, Hungary. 
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Transactional irreversibility, in the above sense, is implicit in Walras' Law and the 
tstonnement process, but it was first formulated explicitly as Ville's miom, viz. 
"No (price) path exists which moves always in the preferred dimion but ends at its starting 
point" [Ville 511 
The Ville axiom was originally set forth as a necessary condition for the existence of a differentiable 
total utility function, depending only on quantities of exchangeable goods. Ville's axiom is applicable 
at the level of an economic system (i.e. a market) for which a unique price is defined for each 
commodity. The corresponding axiom in our case can be stated: 
mere is no spontaneous transaction between two economic decision-makers resulting in 
negative (or zero) surplus values for either party. 
Nothing is assumed at this stage about prices. 
The stronger principles of profit maximization and utility maximization, on which most of neo- 
classical economics was built, are not necessary to obtain our result. Irreversibility of transactions 
follows from the condition that neither party will undertake a transaction leaving himher less well off. 
Bounded rationality (BR) is sufficient to guarantee irreversibility. Yet the implications of transactional 
irreversibility were never explored by the pioneers of utility theory, such as Jevons, Walras, Pareto, 
Fisher and Edgeworth. 
It has been pointed out by Mirowski, for instance, that the analogy between physical science 
and moral science was very clear to the early neo-classicists [Mirowski 841. Mirowski cites a variety 
of evidence supporting this assertion [Mirowski 891. For instance Stanley Jevons (1905) stated that 
"The notion of value is to our science what that of energy is to mechanics" [ibid], although Mirowski 
contends that Jevons misunderstood the physics. Walras wrote in 1862 of his intention to try to create 
"a science of economic forces analogous to the science of astronomical forc =...the analogy is complete 
and striking." Later he wrote an article entitled "6conomique et MCcaniquen full of analogies (some 
erroneous) between mechanics and economics [ibid]. Fisher included a table showing the concordance 
between physics and economic variables in his 1926 book [ibid]. 
For a final instance, Edgeworth discusses this analogy at length in the opening chapter of his 
1881 book "Mathematical Psychics", where the following passage is to be found: 
"The application of mathematics to the world of soul is awntenand by the hypothesis that every psychical 
phenomenon is the concomitant, and in some sense, the other side of a physical phenomenon. 'Ihe particular 
hypothesis adopted in these pages, that Pleasure is the concomitant of Energy. Energy may be regarded as 
the central idea of Mathematical Physics; maximum energy the objed of the principal investigations in that 
science. By aid of this conception we reduce into scientific ader physical phenomena, the complexity of 
which rnay be cornpared with the complexity which appears so fonnidable in Social Sciencew. 
For Jevons, Walras, Pareto, Edgeworth (and the other neoclassicists) the central problem of 
mathematical economics (or psychics) was to determine the conditions for maximization of pleasure 
(or utility). In particular, neoclassical economics since Walras has focussed intensively on the 
conditions for existence of a general equilibrium, rather than on the properties of non-equilibrium 
states and the approach to equilibrium. In this respect, the neoclassical program was very different 
from ours. 
We wish to show that irreversibility, as defined above, together with the assumption of a 
universal medium of exchange (money), is sufficient to prove the existence of aprogressfunction that 
is non-decreasing except for long-run depreciation and aging effects. Nevertheless to include this 
irreversibility into economic theory we have to modify some of the canonical assumptions of General 
Equilibrium Theory. Indeed, the exercise yields an unexpected reward in terms of suggesting new 
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micro-economic models and new interpretations of existing data, as will be seen below. It also 
confirms the analogy between social science and physical science [Edgeworth ibid], in one respect, 
at least: our non-decreasing progress function is closely analogous to the familiar non-decreasing 
entropy function of thermodynamics. Yet, its derivation from axiomatic economic first principles is 
rigorous. It involves no thermodynamical reasoning. 
Assume the existence of an economic unit (EU), which may (or may not) be one of many 
units which together constitute an economic system (ES). An EU is defined for our purposes as the 
smallest entity with an implicit or explicit decision-making rule with the property that no economic 
transaction occurs that leaves the EU worse off than before the transaction. This rule is termed 
bounded rationality (BR) for convenience, hereafter. If the EU's are part of an ES (which involves 
some further assumptions, including a set of rules governing exchange transactions) then a system-wide 
medium-of-exchange can be assumed. It will be called money. 
By assumption, an EU may be capable of any of three types of transactions: production, 
consumption, and exchange. An EU would normally be either a f m  or an individual3. EU's may 
interact with each other only in binary fashion, via exchanges of goods4, using a medium of exchange 
(not necessarily money). An aggregation of EU's is an Economic System (ES). We do not assume the 
existence of an unique posted market price known to all EU's for pairwise economic exchanges 
between EU's. In each individual exchange there is a money transfer corresponding to the goods 
transfer. Prices, in our theory, are defined only for specific transactions. (It will be shown in a 
subsequent paper that in a static pure exchange model, pairwise exchange prices converge to a unique 
equilibrium price). Nevertheless, market prices for an ES can be defined only in the equilibrium limit; 
in the non-equilibrium case individual transaction prices vary among transactors and over time. 
None of the components of an EU are themselves EUTs. This means that the employees of a 
firm are not components of the firm; they are independent EUTs who contract voluntarily with it to 
sell their labor to the firm in exchange for wages. A firm may be credited with a certain amount of 
potential labor only in the sense that it has explicit (or implicit) contracts with a certain workforce. 
The only owners and sellers of labor are individuals, while (by convention) the only producers of 
goods are firmss. Thus organizations are assumed to have an existence and a decision-making rule 
(BR) independent of the identities of their members (who may come and go). 
It is assumed that no transaction of any type occurs in the absence of an explicit decision to 
act, based on the BR decision-rule. The criterion for a positive decision is that the EU not be left 
worse off than it was before. This can be restated in more precise terms. We assume that well-offness 
(welfare) is a function of the economic state of the EU. The latter is determined by a set of 
observables. Examples of observables include stocks of money, durable goods, and raw materials, 
potential output of labor per period, skill level of the labor, money income (wage and non-wage) per 
period, consumption of goods per period, consumption of unpriced environmental services per period, 
In the real world an EU might also be a government agency, ccmp, a foundation, a commune, a aiminal aganization, 
a church, or some other entity. 
4 In general, services can also be exchanged for gaxJs (or other services). However we restrict ourselves at this stage to 
transactions invdving only tangible goods or labor. The extension to other services will be considered later. 
A selfemployed person is therefore a worker who does not sell his labor to any other firm, but uses it himself for 
production purposes. 'Ihis confusion of rdes in praaic. creates no conceptual difficulty. 
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stock of economically useful knowledge and (in the case of an individual human being) physical health 
and life-expectancy. The observables are, of course, variables of the system. 
The above assumptions make it possible to introduce the concept of internal worth or simply 
worth. The worth of the good is 
where X; stands for the quantity of the i' good, and M for the money. The obvious alternatives, value 
and utility, have already been established in economic theory, and have acquired conventional 
meanings. It is important for us to distinguish worth from both value and utility (although at first sight 
the three words have similar connotations to the non-specialist). The economic worth of a good is 
defined for (and by) each EU, and known only to the EU. Assuming BR, an EU agrees to sell a good 
if and only if its worth is less than the price offered by another EU; conversely, an EU agrees to buy 
the good if and only if the worth of the good received equals or exceeds the price offered. Similar 
logic can be applied for the production (consumption) decision. 
In the special case where the EU is indifferent to whether the transaction takes place, or not, 
the internal worth of the exchanged goods must be exactly equal to the money price. (In this case, and 
only this case, the exchange is reversible). The above definition is basically the same as that used 
conventionally for value in microeconomics [Debreu 591, with three differences: 
(i) It presumes only bounded rationality (BR), not perfect rationality. In the standard 
case, producers maximize profit, while consumers maximize utility. In our case, BR 
is applicable to both consumption and produdion decisions. 
(ii) It depends only on the internal state (quantities of goods and money) of an economic 
unit (EU), and is independent of the economic system (ES) to which the EU belongs, 
except insofar as money is somehow created by the larger economic system. In the 
case of general equilibrium, by contrast, value is system-determined. 
(iii) Internal worth does not determine the actual path of the economic process. It only 
determines whether the process is p i b l e  or not in each speclfic case. However, the 
rate at which an economic process takes place, for instance, involves additional 
factors, including technological capabilities and constraints, and individual charaderis- 
tics. The real process cannot be desaibed without specifying these factors and 
constraints. 
Any production, consumption or exchange transaction will result in a change in the economic state of 
the EU through the change of quantities of goods and money. For instance, a production decision will 
involve a conversion of raw materials and actual labor into finished goods for sale. An exchange 
transaction is a sale of goods for money at an agreed pri&. A consumption transaction is only possible 
for individuals: it may be a conversion of potential labor (leisure time) into actual labor at an agreed 
money wage, or an exchange of money for either consumable goods (food, clothing, shelter, 
medicines, etc) or for consumer durables. A consumption transaction could also be an addition to 
money savings or a subtraction from money savings for current expenses. It is important to note that, 
since each EU may have a different decision rule, two Eu 's  would be likely to assign a different worth 
for each good, even if both were in the same economic state. 
It is convenient, for what follows, to distinguish between extensive variables which, in some 
sense, measure the size of the system, and intensive variables, which are ratios and which measure 
characteristics that are independent of size. Stocks of goods and money are examples of extensive 
variables. Intensive variables can be ratios of extensive variables. Worth (defined above) is another 
example. 
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The rate of change of extensive variables can always be expressed in terms of flows6: 
where J" is net imports of the i' commodity (imports minus exports) and S ~ S  the net production 
(production minus consumption) of the i' commodity within the EU. (Here it is also assumed, for 
convenience, that durable goods have lifetimes long compared to the reference period, and that 
consumables are used only by human beings in their role as worker-consumers for the satisfaction 
of biological subsistence requirements). By similar logic, one can write 
where P,% the money cost (market price) of one unit of the i' good or commodity and P is the net 
financial inflow, i.e. the difference between credits, subsidies, interest or dividends received, loans or 
investments from outside the EU (e.g. dividends or capital gains) and debits (interest or dividends paid, 
taxes paid, losses on external investments, etc.). 
For convenience, introduce a new notation J"' which is interpreted as the flow of commodity 
i from unit fl to unit a, where 
i.e. every flow to the EU can be identified by origin. For conserved quantities (i.e. goods) 
For non-conserved quantities (e.g. knowledge) equation (5) does not hold. Technology transfer 
increases the knowledge stock of the recipient, without reducing that of the donor. 
Let pB be the (non-trade) financial flows from unit fl to unit a and plaB is the price of the 
?' good in the exchange between the a' and fl' EU. 
So the money flow can be written as  
The above assumpions imply that S" = S" (Xf ,z ...) , JTB = J?@ (XfB ,XB ...) , and = P,? (Xfe ,ZB ...). 
These relations characterize the EU, so they can be determined experimentally, at least in a gedanken 
sense. In a subsequent paper we will discuss some further constraints on these functions. 
6 The general bookkeeping equation for any amserved quantity X (sucb as a physical commodity) is 
dt 
where F is a generalized cwrent (inflow) that aosses the boundary of the economic unit and G is a generalized s w c e  (or, with 
a negtive sign, a sink). By assumption X can be any commodity that can  be bought, sdd, produced or cunsumed, including 
money or shares of stock. 
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With one exception, the above assumptions are basically familiar to economists. The exception 
is our more extreme form of decentralization of the exchange process, without a market price in the 
usual sense. In our case (as will be seen later) bounded rationality (BR) acts like a sort of invisible 
hnd, at least to the extent that in the static pure exchange case it leads to an equilibrium. 
A Progress-Function for Firms 
A productive EU (i.e. a firm) can possess and accumulate two kinds of wealth, viz. material 
goods and monetary assets. The former consists of capital goods, raw materials, inventory of work-in- 
progress and unsold final goods. The latter comprises investments, loan portfolios, bank accounts and 
cash. 
The change in wealth AWa of the a* EU during a time period At can now be expressed by 
the accounting balance 
where Vi is the worth expressed in monetary units - of the i* material good or commodity, Xi is the 
stock of the i* material good (or commodity in the EU) and W is the quantity of monetary assets 
held by the a* EU. It would be convenient (our problem would be solved) if AWa, A* andAMa 
could simply be converted into perfect differentials, resulting in an integrable expression. However, 
in its present form this is not possible. 
One way to formulate the problem is to note that the change of wealth IAW is not a well- 
behaved, differentiable function of Xi ,M alone, but depends also on other factors (variable 
parameters). In other words, the change in level of wealth after a finite time is  path dependent; it 
depends on the particular sequence of transactions that is followed in X,,M space. In mathematical 
language, what is needed is an integrating factor. But for the expression (7) as it stands, it cannot 
even be proved that such a factor exists. While A W r  0 for all spontaneous processes (a version of 
Walras' Law7), there exist non-market economic processes arising from cooperative behavior (e.g. 
taxes) such that AW< 0 is  possible. 
The next step, therefore, is to seek a mathematical transformation into a form such that the 
existence of an integrating factor is provable. This means manipulating the expressions into a form that 
explicitly reflects some additional information about the nature of economic transactions that is not 
explicitly reflected in (7). To be specific, we  seek an expression that explicitly reflects the bounded 
rationality of exchanges and the consequent (micro) irreversibility of economic transactions. 
To  accomplish the desired transformation for convenience one can set At = 1 and insert (2) 
and (3) into (7). This yields, after combining terms, 
7 The usual statement of Walm' Law is that the v e d a  product of market prices P and excess demand E is always equal 
to zero in a pure exchange economy, even when equilibrium has not been established. 
A Non-Equilibrium Evolutionary Economic Theory Ayres & Martinb July 22, 1990 
Assuming both trade and production decisions are governed by bounded rationality (BR), it 
follows that the first two terms on the r.h.s. of (8) are non-negative. In other words, the flows are uni- 
direcfiorzol, reflecting the irreversibility caused by BR. Specifically 
is equivalent to asserting that trades only occur when there is an economic benefit to the EU. Similarly 
is equivalent to asserting that a unit of output is only produced (net) if the internal worth to the EU 
is non-negative. It follows from (9) and (10) that, for the a" EU 
What we seek is an integrating function T(X,,M) such that, for each EU independently, 
AW dZ lim - = T- 
A t - O  Af df 
It was proved a number of years ago by Carathhdory [Carathhdory 091 that such an integrating 
function T exists for an irreversible process. The rigorous proof depends on characterizing the 
irreversibility as follows: namely, in the near neighborhood of every point in the state-space there is 
another point arbitrarily nearby that c a ~ o t  be reached by any reversible process when there is no net 
financial inflow (Ia = 0) .  A reversible process in our case is one such that C(Vi- Pi)J i  = 0 and 
I 
CViSi = 0 .  The full proof is complicated and not worth repeating here. Its applicability to the econom- 
i 
ic case, as described above, was first shown by Br6dy, Martinas and Saj6 [Br6dy ef a1 851. Actually, 
a similar proof of integrability was given in 1979 by Hurwicz and Richter [Hurwicz & Richter 791, 
based on the Ville axiom stated previously. The Ville formulation is essentially equivalent to the 
CarathCodory irreversibility condition8. 
In short, the necessary conditions for (12) are satisfied. It follows that, substituting back into 
(8) - and dropping the superscript a for convenience - 
HuMricz and Richter showed that the Ville axiom suffices to prove the integrability of an expression caresponding to 
AW for an economic system (ES), rather than an individual economic unit (EU), provided there exists a unique price veuor 
p(x) for each bundle of goods x .  Later we argue that such a price vector need not exist. For this reason, the total utility fundion 
for an ES is undefined. 
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and from (7) we have 
For future reference, we note that for voluntary p.ocgses (I z 0) equations (1 1) and (12) imply dZ z 0. 
That is to say, Z is absolutely non-decreasing in this case. (It will be seen later that this no longer 
holds true when depreciation of durable goods and consumption processes are introduced). 
The next step is to characterize and select a function Z(Xi,M). Equation (14) implies that 
az - Y 
- 
- - 
ax, T 
and 
The progress function Z contains essentially the same information as the internal worth 
function Vi together with the integrating function T. Equation (14) defines only the TdZ product. To 
define them individually, there are some arbitrary choices to be fixed. First, we want Z to increase in 
a spontaneous economic process. It follows that T should be positive. 
A further requirement on T is that it should be homogeneous of zero* order (to ensure that 
Z is a first-order homogeneous function). Homogeneity to zeroPk order for T means, in effect, that we 
want it to depend only on intensive variables; i.e. ratios of extensive variables. On the other hand, we 
want Z to be homogeneous to the first-order, meaning that its dependence on size (extensive variables) 
is essentially linear. (It can be shown that additivity of the Z-function is only consistent with first-order 
homogeneity. The first-order homogeneity condition is 
Differentiating (17) with respect to h yields, after straightforward manipulation and setting 
h = l ,  
An implication of differentiability is that 
But (14) also holds, whence by matching terms we can derive another equation for either T 
or Vi, viz. 
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When T and are specified Z is determined by (18). 
There are an infinite number of possible functional forms for T, Z. Among them, one of the 
simplest expressions for T satisfying all the required conditions is 
where the gi are coefficients yet to be specified. Substituting (21) into (20), differentiating and 
Vi collecting terms one obtains an integrable equation for . Integrating (and multiplying by ZJ yields 
T 
where ci is a constant of integration. Substituting (22) back into (18) completely defines the form of 
Z, viz. 
(since the gi have not yet been defined). It only remains to find a consistent interpretation of the 
coefficients gi and ki and the quantities Xi.  The physical interpretation of these terms is deferred until 
after the next section. 
An important caveat that must be emphasized is that (21) is only one possible form. In fact, 
there is no guarantee that this particular form is the correct one in any given case. Nor is it necessarily 
true (or even likely) that all EU's in the real world will be characterized by a T-function (or the 
corresponding V-, Z-functions) having the same form. The actual form would have to be determined 
by experiment or observation on a case-by-case basis. However, for idealized models involving 
transactions among indistinguishable (i.e. interchangeable) EU's, it is clear that the mathematical form 
of T and Z should also be indistinguishable, hence identical for our purposes. 
Finally, given that Z has the useful property - to be proved later - that its maximum 
corresponds to a static equilibrium, then the standard second order condition (declining marginal 
internal worth) holds, namely: 
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A Progress Function for Individuals 
It is now appropriate to generalize the foregoing argument. As noted already, individual 
worker-consumers, as EU's, differ from firms in three ways. First, they sell only labor (man-hours) 
in exchange for money wages. Second, they consume (or collect) goods, rather than producing them. 
Evidently, a complete economic system (ES) must consist of both types of EU, namely firms (buyers 
of labor and producers of goods) and worker-consumers (sellers of labor and buyers of goods). Third 
- anticipating the existence of a progress function (or wealth function) Z for individuals - it is clear 
that additional variables related to biological condition (e.g. health and life expectancy) may be 
involved. 
Bearing in mind these key differences, one need not repeat the entire derivation above. It is 
sufficient to note the changes. Thus, equation (7) is also applicable to individuals, with the addition 
of a term L on the r.h.s. Here L represents the present monetary worth of future labor (wages) plus 
any other kinds of personal attributes related to biological condition, such as physical health, vigor, 
appearance, athletic ability, learning and experience. Since these are incommensurable in themselves, 
one must distinguish their quantities from their monetary worth. It is mathematically convenient to 
define a new variable K and a parameter a, as follows: 
Equation (7) is unchanged in form for individuals, except that only one commodity (labor) is 
produced and exported, and all others are imported, either for consumption or accumulation. Since no 
commodities are internally produced (except leisure time and labor), the source terms are all zero or 
negative with these two exceptions. Equation (3) and the interpretation of I as a financial flow are un- 
changed. (Note that I does not include wage income). The analog of (8) can now be rewritten (again 
dropping the superscript a), as follows: 
AW = (PL - VL)JL + c ( V i  - Pi)Ji + c ViSi + KAL + 1 
1 1 
where PL and VL are respectively the unit price of labor (i.e. the wage rate) and the private worth of 
leisure time, Si represents consumption of the i" commodity (still excepting labor and leisure time), 
while K is defined by (25). The first term represents the surplus producer worth of labor sold by the 
EU, while the second term represents the surplus consumer worth of all purchased commodities, 
whether consumed for metabolic purposes, or accumulated. The third term represents the surplus worth 
of consumption for metabolic purposes (i.e. to maintain good health) and being alive. Since health 
depreciates very rapidly in the absence of food, clothing and shelter, it is perfectly consistent with 
bounded rationality for individuals to try to replenish these necessities and even increase them. As 
before, assuming the EU has bounded rationality (BR) it follows that the first three terms on the r.h.s. 
must be non-negative. It follows that 
But the first term is non-negative, as argued previously, and the second term is non-negative during 
the first several decades of life (discussed later). It follows again that AW> I, the analog of (11). As 
argued before, equation (12) holds for EU's if there exist feasible economic transactions under BR 
such that I = 0. This condition was met for producers. Its analog for the worker-consumer also holds 
true, at least if (and when) AL is non-negative. 
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Discounted Present Value 
Vage Income P r o f i l e  
(no te :  Curves are  not t o  s c a l e )  
2 5 5 0 7 5 Age 
Figure 1 : Discounted Present Value of Time & Income Profile 
Making use of results explained in detail in the Appendix to this paper, it is fairly easy to 
show that the form of the labor income component of the function L depends mainly on the age of 
the worker-consumer and, to a lesser extent, on hisher personal discount rate9. As shown schematically 
in Figure 1, L increases from zero to a peak like an elongated S-curve, but declines sharply after age 
55. (The shape depends on educational level; it reaches a peak somewhere around age 30 for unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers and increases with educational level and wage level to about 70 for the 
highest paid segment [Ghez & Becker 751). The discounted present worth curve is shifted to the left 
by a few years (depending on the discount rate). Setting 
Lim AL = L 
At +o 
it can be seen that L has the form of a parabola (inverted U), reaching a maximum positive worth 
around age 25, thence decreasing to zero when L is at its peak, and finally becoming negative. 
Clearly L is not non-negative during the entire worker lifecycle. On the other hand, it is non- 
negative during roughly the first two thirds of it and only becomes negative as workers approach the 
age of retirement from the work-force. During this period, at least, we can exploit the Carathidory 
theorem and assert the existence of an integrating factor Tand a differentiable, non-decreasing progress 
function Z. We think it is not unreasonable to assume that whatever progress function is appropriate 
Its magnitude, on the other hand, depends on sex, skill, prevailing wage rate in the locality, and so on. 
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for worker-consumers during the early part of the life cycle (i.e. when L > 0)  would still be 
applicable thereafter. We make this assumption, albeit with some qualms. 
Proceeding, then, we substitute (12) into (26) obtaining 
TdZ = (PL - VL)JL + X(V; - P i p i  + X V ~ S ;  + KdL + I (29) 
I I 
Extending the sum over the index i to include labor and leisure time as a commodity, using (7), we 
get 
TdZ = z v i d Y i + d M  +KdL 
1 
(30) 
An implication of differentiability is 
Matching terms between (31) and (30) yields equations (15) and (16) as before, plus 
The homogeneity condition (analogous to (17)) is 
AZ = Z ( A X i ,  AM, AL) 
Differentiating (33) with respect to A and setting A = 1 yields 
Differentiating (34) 
comparing (35) with (30) yields the expression 
which is analogous to (20). The equation can be solved for by inserting the previous expression (21) 
for T and (25). Carrying out the indicated differentiations and the same manipulations as in the 
previous case, yields the final result: 
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Vi = giT[lnM + alnL - (1 + a)lnNi+ c,] 
whence 
Z = C g j ~ , [ l n ~  + alnL - (1 + a)lnKFi] 
1 
For the case of a single product, 
Notice that if we neglect L (e.g. by setting a = O ) ,  the previous result (23) is obtained. Again, we 
emphasize that T need not take the simple form we have chosen for convenience. However, for models 
in which the EU's are indistinguishable within a class, one can at least be sure that the T-, V-, and Z- 
functions will have the same form. 
Interpretation 
It is now appropriate to seek reasonable economic interpretations of the expressions for T, V 
and Z. The integrating factor T was defined by (21) as the ratio of money assets to a weighted sum 
of goods assets in the EU. This ratio has an obvious interpretation as liquidity. For a producer, this 
makes the expression (22) for V; easy to interpret. The internal worth of the ih good to a producer is 
directly proportional to the liquidity of the EU, and directly proportional to the weight of that good 
in its inventory. This much is entirely in accord with intuition. 
The logarithmic term is less obvious. It says that, for fixed liquidity T, the internal worth of 
any good to a producer decreases logarithmically the more of that good is on hand, whereas the worth 
of the good as a function of money increases logarithmically. Yet, on reflection, few corporate chief 
executives would find this rule counter-intuitive. In general, money in the bank is preferable to 
inventory, always provided there are goods available on the market to buy. 
The extension of the internal worth concept to individuals (37) is fairly straightforward. The 
constant a is clearly a measure of the individual's preferences between money and other kinds of 
wealth (time, health, life itself). Liquidity appears in much the same way as before. 
It would be a natural mistake, in view of (12) to interpret the product 7Z as wealth. But it 
must be recalled that the integral JAW is path dependent. It was precisely for this reason that we had 
to find an integrating factor. On the other hand, Z is not wealth, either; among other problems, it 
cannot have units of money (TZ does). How, then, shall we interpret Z? 
It is easy to see that Z is at a local maximum when the EU reaches a condition such that 
(under BR) it cannot improve its economic state by engaging in further economic activities. This final 
state of non-activity is, in fact, can be interpreted as an equilibrium for the EU. Thus all economic 
activity can be interpreted as an approach to (Pareto)-equilibrium. The local maximum would not, in 
general, constitute a global maximum in the absence of further specific constraints. 
It is important to emphasize here that Z is nor a classical utility function U, although the utility 
function (when it exists) is also maximized at the equilibrium point. The utility function for an EU 
is better interpreted as the diffrence between the progress function before an exchange and after it. 
The relationship between Z and U is discussed in more detail later. 
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We believe that it is natural to interpret Z as a stock of economically useful information, 
because every good can be expressed in informational terms [Ayres 87a, 87bI. In fact, one can assert 
that each manufactured good is characterized by a distance from thermodynamic equilibrium, hence 
a certain quantity of embodied information: 
where Hi is measured in bits and the coefficient b, has dimensions of informationlquantifl. 
Substituting (40) in (18) we get 
Defining 
we can rewrite Z 
There is no a priori restriction on the dimensionality of Z. We do know that TZ has the 
dimension of money. If we choose to express Z in bits of information, then T has the dimensions of 
money/information and w also has dimensions of moneylinformation. Here T may be interpreted as 
W i  the unit worth of a standard type of information, while wi is the relative unit worth of the i* type. Thus, 
T 
is the relative worth of the i"' type of information. One of the wi can be chosen arbitrarily, for 
convenience." 
The index i over commodities or gooh could equally well be considered as an index over 
types of information embodied in materials, structures, organizations, etc. These include thermodynam- 
ic information, morphological information, symbolic information, organizational information and so  
on. In this context, money M and the worth of expected future labor (and life), L can also be viewed 
as special kinds of information. 
10 We note that information H can be defined diredly in terns of entropy and interpreted as "distance from thermodynamic 
equilibrium" 
Hi = S. - Si 
lo 
where S. is the entropy in the equilibrium state and S, is the entropy in the actual state. (The symbol S is n d l y  used for 
(0 
entropy in thermodynamics, and must not be confused with the earlier usage in equation (2). 'Ihe natural unit for H is the "bit". 
11 It is interesting to note that in thermodynamics a similar situation exists. There the temperature scale is arbitrary, and one 
is free to choose two points on the scale for convenience. (In the orse of the Celsius scale, the zero point is set by the freezing 
point of water and the 100 point is set by the boiling point of water). 
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The Time Dependence of Z 
It should be noted at the outset that, as defined, Z has no explicit time dependence. Changes 
over time occur, of course, but only through changes in the stocks of goods 6) and money M 
belonging to the EU, as  expressed in equations (2) and (3). The source term for money in the 
economic unit is zero, by definition, but the flow term has two components, viz. the net worth (price 
times quantity) of the commodity imported across the borders of the EU and the net financial inflow 
from non-trade transactions (credits, subsidies, taxes, interest o r  dividends on external investments, 
etc). 
Let us now construct a time dependent equation for the progress function Z for an economic 
unit, using the above. Differentiating equation (18) we obtain 
ax. dM 
The next step is to substitute the general expressions (2) for L and (3) for -, which yields 
a? a? 
We can interpret the first term as the trade surplus, the second term as the production/consumption 
surplus and the third term as  the financial in(out)flow. 
Since the EU is assumed to be characterized by (at least) bounded rationality (BR) in its 
decision-making, the first two terms can be assumed to be positive along the path. (The EU will not 
knowingly engage in trades or make production decisions resulting in loss). However, the third term 
is not necessarily subject to BR (taxes, for instance, are involuntary), and consequently can be negative 
dz 
enough to make - for the EU negative also. We note once again that, assuming voluntary processes, 
a? 
dz 
non-negative I and durable goods, - r 0. 
a? 
Now let us change focus from the individual economic unit to the economic system a s  a 
whole, consisting of a set of interacting economic units using the same monetary unit. The progress 
function for the system as  a whole can be defined as a sum over all EU's in the system 
The resulting equation for the system as a whole has a similar form to (45), except that the three terms 
(trade, production and financial) are weighted by the T's of the component EU's: 
With the help of equations (3) and (45), combining all terms, we  obtain a final expression 
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The bounded rationality of the EU's guarantees that the first two terms are positive. The third term 
need not be positive, because the rules governing financial flows are not necessarily governed by the 
BR of individual EU's, but may be enforced by governments (e.g. taxes) or determined by other 
exogenous factors. 
The function T, as noted previously, can usefully be thought of as liquidity. It is interesting 
dZ to examine the conditions under which - is positive. As noted before, the first two terms (trade and 
dt 
production) are always positive by BR. 
It is easy to show, however, that the third term is positive if (and only if) the rules of the 
economic system permit financial flows only from units with larger values of T to units with lower 
values of T. This has a fairly straightforward interpretation in terms of taxes: a regressive tax system 
that consistently (if inadvertently) transfers wealth from the less liquid to the more liquid units will 
eventually stop growing. We conjecture that only a tax system that tends to equalize the liquidity (not 
the wealth) of the units is consistent with continued long term growth. 
Equation (48) describes, in principle, the dynamical approach to general equilibrium. We note 
that our model differs in significant respects from the well-known models of Smale [Smale 761 and 
Aubin [Aubin 8:1]. Smale's model presupposes both a unique posted price for each commodity at all 
times and an all-knowing central planner (or super-auctioneer) with knowledge of the demand 
functions of each consumer. Aubin dispenses with the auctioneer but still presupposes a unique posted 
price known to all EU's. Both Smale and Aubin consider only the pure exchange case. By contrast, 
our model allows production and does not assume either a unique price for all EU's or an auctioneer. 
Nevertheless, in the static case it converges to the Walrasian equilibrium. Details will be presented in 
a subsequent paper. 
The Final Equilibrium State 
If there are no external constraints on growth (e.g. finite resource constraints) there is no 
necessary limit to growth, hence no final state. However in a closed or isolated economy with limited 
resources, limits may exist such that net production approaches zero. Under these conditions, trading 
activity must eventually cease also. 
It was pointed out above that Z is a maximum,when the EU reaches a condition such that 
(under BR) it cannot improve its economic state by engaging in further economic activities. This final 
state of non-activity is, in fact, a Pareto-optimum: it can be interpreted as an equilibrium for the ES. 
Thus all economic activity can be interpreted as an approach to (Pareto)-equilibrium, although 
final (static) equilibrium is never actually reached. 
From (48) it can be seen that the condition for Paretobptimum is dZ = 0. This can occur if = prp 
vps; (i.e.v:=v:=...)orif J P @ = O  and if x-=O and Zap = O  or z a = Z f ' .  
a.i Ta 
The conditions under which a Pareto optimum is also a global optimum are that V: = v,? = ... 
and T: = = ... for all i. In other words, the case of a Pareto optimum that is not a global optimum 
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is characterized by unequal liquidities. We will discuss the approach to equilibrium in a subsequent 
Paper. 
If there were no physical depreciation of goods or loss of information, it would be possible 
dz to assure (subject to appropriate policy choices) that - never decreases. The final state (bliss) could 
dt 
remain constant forever. This is not possible, however, for reasons to be discussed presently. 
The Relationship Between the Utility Function 
& the Progress Function 
In the present context the economic unit possesses goods (durable and perishable) as  well as 
money. In neoclassical demand theory, one standard formulation (e.g. [Lancaster 87 p.1221) is as 
follows: the individual consumer is assumed to have a continuous utility function u(x) defined on an 
n-vector of goods and to be constrained to buy at given prices from a fixed money income m. The n 
goods of the model are assumed to comprise the consumer's universe, so  that he spends all his income 
on those goods. His actual behavior is assumed to be as if he solved the following classical optimizing 
problem, 
max u(x) s.t. px = m (49) 
Thus, in the neo-classical spirit, a utility maximization problem for pure exchange can be formulated 
in terms of the progress function Z as follows 
Maximize Z(X + a, M -Pa%') s.t. P6.Y = Constant (50) 
where X symbolizes the (vector) set of goods. (A good, here is anything that can be exchanged, 
produced or consumed). Nevertheless for the progress function Z, such an extremum principle cannot 
be consistently applied, inasmuch as the economic unit is not a maximizer (by assumption) but merely 
a satisficer. The progress function Z introduced above nevertheless is related to the neo-classical utility 
function. To  show both the similarities and differences it is convenient to begin by considering the 
simplest possible case, the pure exchange economy where nothing is either produced or consumed. 
Consider a hypothetical exchange of an amount x of some vector of goods X for an amount 
of money m. The connection between Z and the classical utility function U(x) is straightforward, viz. 
If only one commodity in amount x, is involved, and P is the price per unit 
From the above it is clear that the general form of the utility-function U must be U = U(X,M,x). 
Evidently this is consistent with the proofs in the literature demonstrating the non-existence of a 
utility-function with the simpler form U = U(x) [e.g. Kornai 731. The foregoing argument clearly 
supports the introduction of the progress function as a more fundamental quantity. The non-transitivity 
of preference-ordering for U is clear from the above rzlation. As the economic agent has only imper- 
fect information and bounded rationality (BR), it only knows enough to decline any exchange transac- 
tion with negative U. (Bargaining strategies leading to lesser or greater gains are still possible, howev- 
er). Nevertheless the choice is not governed by any principle of U(x) or ZOC) maximization. 
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Depreciation 
One flaw in the picture as presented so far is that physical goods (and, for that matter, even 
stored information) are subject to aging, deterioration, erosion, corrosion, loss and wear - in short, 
depreciation. These phenomena are not reflected in (43, as it stands, because (45) is a bookkeeping 
relationship for truly ~ 0 n S e ~ e d  quantities. 
Let us return to the information representation by differentiating (40) and substituting (45), 
dropping the superscript a for convenience: 
Now we can interpret the first term as an information flow, and the second term as an information 
source. The third term contains something new: if bi stands for the information content of a unit 
quantity of the commodity 4, then the third term represents a change in embodied information per unit 
time that is not the result of economic processes. To the extent that it occurs, it is a consequence of 
the second law of thermodynamics (increasing entropy). 
In other words, the third term of (49) reflects the increase of entropy and disorder due to 
physical processes. If we were to repeat the derivation of (47) and (48) from scratch, using the infor- 
mation representation (i.e. substituting (40) into (18) and then carrying out the indicated operations, 
then an additional term will appear at the end, reflecting the change in information content of the 
commodity stock of the EU. This additional term, representing spontaneous wealth depreciation D is 
as follows: 
By defining Di with the negative sign convention, it can be seen that 
Di z 0 
Di for all i. The depreciation rate (more familiar) is just . The complete time dependent equation, 
b,Ni 
in simplified verbal form, can be written as follows: 
a2 
- = [trade surplus] + [production surplus] + wnancial inloutf2ow] - [depreciation] (56) 
dl 
It is implicit in the above, but should be stated explicitly, that the numerical values of depreci- 
ation rates and other system parameters that determine the dynamics of the system are not determined 
by any of the economic characteristics initially assumed. (On the other hand, the economic behavior 
of any real system is very much affected by these parameters). 
A final point worth emphasis is the following: The Z function is a consequence of economic 
irreversibility. It would be absolutely non-decreasing (in the absence of financial flows) but for the 
metabolic needs of humans and animals, and depreciation. Both aye due to the intervention of the 
second law of thermodynamics, which is a direct consequence of irreversibility in the physical domain. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Three concluding comments suggest themselves. In the first place, it is very tempting to try 
to define a progress function for the economic system ES as a whole. However, as noted already, BR 
is not applicable to the economic system as a whole, whence it is not possible to derive either an 
integrating factor nor a progress function for an ES. It is worth emphasizing yet again that, whereas 
most axioms and theorems of neoclassical economics deal with an ES, we have restricted ourselves 
initially to individual economic units (EU's) and pairwise transactions between EU's. 
Our exclusive concern with individual EU's and pairwise transactions explains why we do not 
need to use utility maximization, and why bounded rationality (BR) is sufficient. On the other hand, 
it seems plausible that - for an EU, where it is definable - one could develop a variational principle 
for optimization purposes. The basic idea of constrained maximization has already been applied often 
in economics, with a variety of objective functions often chosen rather arbitrarily. We have already 
noted that Z is a maximum when the EU is in a Pareto-optimum state, i.e. a state such that further 
economic activity will not improve its condition. It would seem, therefore, that it is Z that should be 
maximized. This being so, we can also consider maximizing the sum over all EU's in the ES, viz. 
Absent BR for the system as a whole, one cannot prove that Z for the system as a whole actually tends 
toward such a maximum. However, it is not implausible that a government might reasonably adopt 
the objective of maximizing Z. It is also quite plausible that the individual EU's within the ES would 
agree (if consulted) to such a maximization policy for the ES as a whole. We intend to discuss some 
implications of this in a future paper. 
The third and final comment is that there is, indeed, a close analogy between economics and 
thermodynamics. In fact, the foregoing derivation proceeds in detail along the same lines as Carathh- 
dory's axiomatic development of thermodynamics. The basis of the analogy is that irreversibility plays 
a key role in each case. It is also true that function Tin our derivation is like the temperature; the non- 
decreasing function Z in our derivation as like entropy, the product TZ is like enthalpy, wealth W is 
like heat, and so on [Martinis 891. We freely admit having referred to the analogous arguments in 
thermodynamics to help us see our way. But the analogy was only a guide. The economic derivations 
as we have presented them above are rigorous: they stand on their own. 
Actually, there may be a deeper connection between thermodynamics and economics than we 
have claimed. The fact the Z plays the same role in our theory as entropy does in classical thermody- 
namics is not coincidental. Irreversibility is the key in both cases, as we have noted earlier. 
It is interesting that a number of physicists from Szilard and Brillouin on have argued that 
information is negative entropy (or negentropy, in Brillouin's language)12. We, on the other hand, 
have argued that the function which plays the same role as entropy in our formulation of economics 
is information. The logical circle appears to be closed. 
12 See, for instance [Szilard 29, Brillouin 53; Jaynes 57, 57al. 
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SELF-ORGANIZATION OF MARKETS 
& THE APPROACH TO EQUILIBRIUM 
by Robert U. Ayresl and Katalin ~ a r t i n a i s ~  
Background 
The existence of a static general equilibrium (Pareto-optimal) state for a pure exchange 
economy was conjectured by Walras [Walras 1874, 19541. It is assumed that each consumer's 
consumption of commodity Xi is determined by a demand function depending only on the price Pi 
The problem is to find an equilibrium price Pi for the i' commodity such that total demand does not 
exceed total supply (viability constrain?), viz. 
and no consumer spends more than helshe earns (budget constraint). The budgetary constraint can be 
regarded as  a property of the individual consumer's demand function (Walras' law).The existence of 
such a static equilibrium was first proved rigorously for several models in the 1930's by Wald. 
Simpler and more general proofs, using Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, were given later by McKenzie 
[McKenzie 541 and by Arrow and Debreu [Arrow & Debreu 541. 
For the dynamic case, Walras suggested a hypothetical price adjustment process known as 
atonnement (groping), which has been described in the following way: 
"Suppose, as Walras did, a set of prices arbitrarily given; then supply may exceed 
demand on some markets and fall below on others (unless the initial set is in fact the 
equilibrium set, there must be at least one case of each, by Walra.' law4). Suppose 
the markets are considered in some definite order. On the first market, adjust the price 
so that supply and demand are equal, given all other prices; this will normally require 
raising the price if demand initially exceeded supply, decreasing it in the opposite 
case. The change in the first price will change supply and demand in all other 
I Camegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.,USA, and the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
Roland Eohros University, Budapest, Hungary. 
It is a fundamental axiom in economics and in life that consumption of physical goods cannot exceed available supply. 
Koopmans has called this "the impossibility of the land of Cockaigne" p<ooprnans 511. 
4 Walras' law states that the vector produd of prices P and excess demand E is always equal to zero, even when general 
equilibrium has not established. See foomote 3. 
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markets. Repeat the process with the second and subsequent markets. At the end of 
one round the last market will be in equilibrium, but none of the others need be 
because the adjustments on subsequent markets will destroy the equilibrium achieved 
on any one. However, Walras argued, the supply and demand functions for any given 
commodity will be more affeded by the changes in its own price than by changes in 
other prices; hence after one round the markets should be more nearly in equilibrium 
than they were to begin with, and with successive rounds the supply and demand on 
each market will tend to equality" [Arrow & Hahn 71, pp.4-51. 
Such a process was described mathematically, and its stability was investigated in the early 1%0's, 
e.g. [Uzawa 62; Morishima 62; Hahn 62; Hahn & Negishi 62; Arrow & Hahn 711. The dtonnement 
approach basically involves a succession of convergent estimates of the excess demand E (starting 
from a general condition of shortages) as a function of price. It assumes that the price of any 
commodity in an economic system follows a path determined by a differential equation of the form 
where the final equilibrium state is defined by E i  = 0 for every commodity in the system as a whole. 
However the condition of the market can only be determined by an all-knowing super-auctioneer who 
calls out prices and receives offers6. There can be no actual exchange transactions, however, until the 
market-clearing price has been determined. Hence there is no operational mechanism for the dynamical 
approach to equilibrium in the Walrasian paradigm. Thus, though the Walrasian model is decentral- 
ized in the sense that consumers make independent decisions without knowing anything except the 
price, it is not implementable in real markets. 
The next step forward was taken by Smale [Smale 761. In brief, Smale was able to prove the 
existence of viable price paths corresponding to a sequence of possible exchanges (reflecting 
transaction costs) between any starting point and the final market-clearing equilibrium state. He also 
showed that his exchange adjustment process -once begun - will not stop unless forced to by market 
The alternative possibility of starting from a condition of excess supply is ruled out by the assumption offree dispoi~al 
of any hypothetical excess. Of course this is equivalent to assuming free d i s p l  of wastes and pollutants, which is inueasingly 
untenable. The pcssibility of storage of goods from one period to the next is also negleded.In neo-clarsical demand theory the 
individual consumer is assumed to have a continuom (class f?) utility fundion U(X) defined on an n-vecta of goods X and 
to be constrained to buy at given prices from a fixed money income M. The n goods of the model are sssumed to ampromise 
the consumer's universe, so that he spends all his income on thcse goods. F a  instance, in Smale's approach an eco& slate 
means a set of data charaderizing the economy at a given time. - and in a pure exchange economy a state will d s t  of an 
allocation of the resources, or equivalently the set of goods of each agent and a price system [Smale 761. So the actual behavior 
of economic agents is assumed to be as if they solved the following dassical optimization problem: 
Maximize U(X) s.t. PX = M 
The X, belonging to the set of solutions of the above classical optimization problem, is the demand. The excess dernand E is 
then definable by aggregating the amounts that are demanded by all consumers and subtracting the total sum of current prod- 
udion and available supplies. If Ei is the excess demand f a  the i* good, the definition of equilibrium in the market is as 
follows: 
This implies that either excess demand is zero a price is zero (Walras' Law). Every good with excess supply is afree good 
under the classic presaiption. 
6 A computerized system of this sort has been postulated for the stock market, although not yet implemented. 
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conditions and that it will converge to the Walrasian static equilibrium. However, Smale's model still 
assumes that all decision-makers possess perfect knowledge of all prices and consumption levels in 
the market. Thus, Smale's model is implementable, in principle, by an omnipotent central planner but 
at the sacrifice of the decentralization property. 
There is a large literature on (central) planning, in the sense of large-scale constrained 
maximization. For a real economy this could involve tens of thousands or millions of units, with a 
correspondingly large number of equations to solve. Hence, during the heyday of mathematical 
research on planning methodologies, the idea of informational decentralization was explored, 
especially by Hurwicz. In some approaches to planning the central authority provides price guidance 
to the individual EU's, using quantity productiodexchange information as the basis for its 
computations. Alternatively, the central planner may utilize transactional price data as  an input, and 
provide guidance to the EU's in terms of quantitative production targets. There are numerous schemes 
for accomplishing this massive information collection/reduction task in several disjoint stages, each 
of which can be independent of the other; see, for instance, [Arrow & Hurwicz 601; [Hurwicz 691; 
[Heal 731; [Heal 861. It should be emphasized that the term decentralization in this literature does not 
imply the absence of planning per se. 
Aubin has addressed the problem in a different way with his viability theory [e.g. Aubin 811. 
He has shown that viable price-adjustment trajectories exist, subject to an assumption considerably 
weaker than Smale's, namely that economic agents know only the prices paid in all transactions, but 
not the consumption levels of all other agents. Each agent is assumed to be guided by an 
individualized demand function which depends on knowledge of the (unique) market price at each 
point in time, but not on the consumption of other agents. Effectively, for the a* consumer and the 
?' commodity 
where Pi(t) is the market price of the ih commodity. The individual demand functions are assumed 
to obey a dynamical version of the Walras law (budget constraint). Effectively, the consumer's total 
expenditure during each infinitesimal time period is non-increasing. Such a price trajectory must also 
satisfy the supply (viability) constraint (2). Aubin has shown that the instantaneous collective Walras 
law, which is designed for permanently balancing the budget, provides also price systems embodying 
enough information to guarantee that the viability constraint is also satisfied in a decentralized way. 
Aubin's model is therefore implementable in real markets, in the sense that actual exchange 
transacdons are possible along the path. Moreover, a much greater degree of true decentralization of 
decision-making is allowed. It does not assume optimization on the part of consumers; satisficing 
(bounded rationality) is sufficient. Nor does it assume a supervisory auctioneer - o r  the equivalent - 
to actively match buyers and sellers. It does, however, presume some invisible hand mechanism that 
receives and disseminates price information about all transactions as they occur, thus ensuring the' 
existence of a unique market price for each good at each moment in time. 
In the discussion of the existence market equilibrium, the existence of a set Ei of excess 
demand vectors associated with each commodity price Pi is generally accepted as  a precondition. This 
implies the existence of a unique point-mapping Di(Pi). The adjustment process implied by neo- 
classical theories represents an arbitrary and unrealistic assumption concerning the behavior of 
economic agents. However there is no fundamental theory concerning the behavior of economic 
decision makers away from the equilibrium state; there are only theories of equilibrium behavior. 
Thus, there is no neo-classical theory to explain the self-organization of markets. Such a theory 
requires a model of interactions based on strictly binary (pair-wise) transactions among economic units 
acting on the basis of bounded rationality and lacking any information about other EU's except for 
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the prices at which they have previously exchanged goods with other EU's. The approach to static 
equilibrium in a self-organizing pure exchange market must be shown to occur without any centralized 
authority such as an auctioneer (still less a central planner) who receives and processes information 
about all transactions on a current basis. Only such a model can be the basis for extension to the more 
general case where production and economic growth (or decline) are also considered. 
A Self-organizing Model of the Market 
In the model of equilibration to be described hereafter, there is no auctioneer and prices are 
determined only by bargaining between individual buyers and sellers. Each agent knows only its own 
economic state7 at all times, including worth for all goods and services available in the market. (The 
problem of valuation is discussed below). Uniqueness of commodity prices away from equilibrium is 
not assumed, and would not normally occur, because actual exchange prices are known only to the 
parties. It will be shown that a convergent price adjustment process nevertheless exists in the static, 
pure exchange case. It leads to a unique final equilibrium price applicable to all economic units. 
To summarize the following discussion briefly in advance, it argued that an integrableprogress 
filtctiorz Z exists for each economic unit [Ayres & Martinis 901. (A consumer is an economic unit). 
This function has the property that it never decreases in any pure voluntary exchange transaction of 
infinitesimal magnitude. In other words, dZ z 0. This property permits us to characterize the final 
equilibrium state for each economic unit as the state of maximum Z, which corresponds to the 
condition dZ = 0. Convergence is easily demonstrated by simple arguments, not only for the pure 
exchange case, but also for more general situations. Before addressing the dynamical problem of 
equilibration, per se, we need to introduce the progress function formally. 
When the market is not in equilibrium there is no unique murketprice. On the contrary, prices 
negotiated between individual buyers and sellers may differ considerably from each other. (This 
phenomenon is easily observable in real marketplaces). Nevertheless, as  the number of exchanges 
becomes very large, the price fluctuations gradually decrease and prices approach limiting values. It 
is this convergent process, which can occur without any centralized information gathering and 
dissemination mechanism, that should probably be termed the invisible hand. It is what we mean, 
today, when we speak of self-organization. 
The Progress Function Z for Economic Units 
In a previous paper [Ayres & Martin&, op  cit.], the authors have derived a computable 
progress fincfion Z and an associated integrating function T (which can be interpreted as liquidity). 
These two functions are definable for each economic unit (EU) depending only on the observable 
extensive variables (e.g. money and goods) that define its economic state (see footnote 5). The meta- 
economic assumptions needed to derive the progress function and the associated liquidity function, are 
the following: 
7 ?he economic state of an economic unit (EU) is defined by observable& such as st& of m e y ,  fixed capital, inventory 
and consumption goods, potential output of labor and capital per unit time (productivity), current levelsof consumption of gmds 
and economic services - and environmental services - per unit time, stock of economically useful knowledge (know-how) and 
in the case of individuals, physical health and well-being and life expectancy. 
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I. Standard microeconomic assumptions, viz. 
(i) economic processes consist of trade and production/consumption; 
(ii) an economic unit is an entity capable of independent rarional decisions with 
respect to whether or not to undertake economic processes, based on current 
information; an economic unit can be a firm, a family unit, or  an individual 
worker/consumer; 
(iii) the state of an economic unit is characterized by the quantity of goods 
(including capital stock, inventory, and consumer goods) which appear in 
economic processes, and by its money stock); and 
(iv) the system has no memory of previous transactions (Markovian processes). 
11. Non-standard microeconomic assumptions are as  follows: 
(i) economic units do  not optimize, but make decisions under bounded rationality 
(BR); in a spontaneous economic process no economic agent voluntarily 
undertakes any economic activity resulting in decrease of its wealth; 
(ii) money is a universal equivalent, for all units, and 
(iii) there is no unique market price (except in the static equilibrium 
limit); all transactions are pairwise exchanges of goods for money, 
and the price of the goods exchanged is determined in pairwise 
bargaining. 
In summary, the derivation requires three key non-standard assumptions: (i) that money - a 
universal medium of exchange - is defined exogenously, (ii) that EU's make decisions based on 
bounded rationality (BR) in the sense of Simon [Simon 55, 59, 821 - so-called perfect rationality is 
not required - and (iii) there is no unique market price. It is important to emphasize that BR is a 
sufficient condition to guarantee the irreversibility of voluntary exchange transactions. Irreversibility 
of exchange transactions, in turn, is a sufficient condition for the existence of the function Z and the 
liquidity function T. 
An important feature of the progress function is that it does not depend on the market price 
of any commodity. Indeed, except for the assumed existence of a universal medium of exchange 
(money) no market price in the usual sense is presumed to exist. The progress function for an 
economic unit generally can be written as, , 
It is a consequence of irreversibility, in the sense noted above, that 
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Dynamics of Pure Exchange 
To compare the different approaches it is useful to begin with a concrete illustration of an 
exchange market. Smale offers, as  an example, the mineral bourse or a large mineral show. This kind 
of market lasts two or three days; initially buyers, dealers, traders (many agents are all three) bring 
mineral specimens of some worth and/or money. When the show starts, minerals are traded, bought 
and sold, more quickly at first, and one sees price equilibrium reached in the afternoon of the last day 
as prices stabilize and exchange slows to a halt. The exact equilibrium depends on factors such as 
which agents first encounter each other [Smale 76  p. 2121. 
Here a process is a path (over time) in the space of states of an economy. Smale has given 
the exchange axioms for the process in his model of the approach to the equilibrium state [Smale 761. 
The exchange axioms for the process assert that: 
a. the total resources of the economy are constant (i.e.there is no production); 
b. exchange takes place at current prices (there is only one price for each good, 
at a given time) 
c. an exchange increases satisfaction of the participating agents; 
d. some exchange will take place provided that it is possible consistent with a, 
b, and c above. 
Our case differs from Smale's in one main respect only. Whereas the neo-classical theory assumes a 
unique price for all transactions of the same type at a given time (axiom b), we can dispense with this 
assumption. We merely assume that a price is determined by pairwise bargaining between the parties 
for each transaction, subject to (c). 
To prove convergence of the process to equilibrium, recall that Z is increased for both parties 
in every transaction (a consequence of (6)). Transactions will cease when Z is maximum, i.e. when 
for all possible transactions dZ < 0 at least for one of the parties (Pareto-optimum). Thus transactions 
can occur if, and do occur only if, prior to the transaction, the worth of the commodity to the buyer(yb) 
is greater than (or equal to) the agreed price, which is in turn greater than or equal to the worth of the 
commodity to the seller (V,'), that is 
From (lo), it is easy to prove that, in the final equilibrium state, the worth V for each commodity is 
identical for all economic units, since vib = p i  = V: is the condition under which the exchanges must 
stop. 
The price at which an exchange takes place may be anywhere between the bottom and the top 
of the allowed range yb - V: depending on the bargaining strategies of the parties. Assuming the 
actual quantity exchanged is infinitesimal, the result of the exchange is as follows: (i) Z increases for 
both parties as a consequence of (6); (ii) the worth (reservation price) y of the iPk good shifts infini- 
tesimally up for the seller (who now has less) and down for the buyer (who now has more) and, (iii) 
the liquidity T shifts infinitesimally up for the seller (who receives money) and down for the buyer 
(who spends money). 
The next time the same two parties meet to bargain, the range of possible prices is accordingly 
reduced. The increase of Z and the convergence of T values are both measures of this narrowing of 
the window of possible transactions. If only infinitesimal exchanges are permitted, convergence to the 
final state is obvious though we have not excluded the possibility that it might take an infinite amount 
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of time. (It is interesting to note the similarity - and the difference - between the process considered 
here and the Walrasian Gtonnement described above). 
For the more realistic situations of finite exchanges, convergence is still assured by the 
following simple device. Let the quantity exchanged in each transaction be reduced monotonically. 
(Many rules are possible: for instance, the quantity offered for sale by an EU could be reduced each 
time in proportion to the percentage change - normally an increase - in the worth of that commodity 
resulting from the last sale). After a transaction, there are now two possibilities. The first possibility 
is that each EU is closer to equilibrium than before, in which case the Z value for each is larger. In 
this case the buyer will continue to buy, and the seller will continue to sell. The second possibility is 
that the transaction was too big resulting in an overshoot. The buyer (who inadvertently bought too 
much) will observe that his worth has fallen to the point where he will now become a seller if another 
EU is ready to offer a higher price, and vice versa. The possibility of indefinite oscillation is precluded 
by the rule of declining quantities. 
The non-negativity of dZ (equation (6)) evidently does not completely define the path to 
equilibrium. It does, however, constrain the direction of any voluntary process. The actual quantity of 
goods exchanged and the rate of (decentralized) price evolution will depend on other characteristics 
of the economic units, including their pricing strategies and rules for fixing quantities offered or  sought 
in any one exchange transaction. The path also depends on the operation of the marketplace itself, 
especially the rate at which encounters between potential buyers and sellers occurs. 
If the process proceeds to a global optimum, then =Pi for all a (i.e. for all buyers and 
sellers) and T b  =TS, i.e. all the EU's have the same final T. This is a criterion for global optimum. 
It was shown in our previous paper [Ayres & Martin& 9Oa] that liquidities of different EU's do not 
normally approach equality, except (i) in the special case where all EU's are indistinguishable (i.e. they 
have exactly the same T,V and Z functions) and (ii) at global optimum. In all other cases the 
decentralized exchange process proceeds only to a Pareto optimum. 
Simulations of the Approach to Equilibrium 
In the usual Markovian approach the flow of goods between sellers and buyers, J can be 
written 
and, in principle, the price P is determined by the worth 
p = P(VS,Vb) 
We have emphasized that economic interactions occur only in a pairwise fashion. However, 
we now wish to focus on a single economic unit (EU). Thus we designate one EU in a market, i.e. 
surrounded (as it were) by an undifferentiated cloud of other economic units with which it interacts, 
one at a time. The flow, in this approximation is between the designated unit and all others. Now the 
flow is only a function of V for the designated unit and P, the market price, i.e the price at which 
exchanges between the designated unit and the cloud occurs. In this approximation the designated EU 
cannot influence the market price: it is a price-raker. 
In principle f could be a continuous function, but in reality transactions are discontinuous and 
finite. This case reduces to the continuous case in the limit of very small, very frequent exchanges. 
Thus, the discontinuous case is the more general one. Since the flow J disappears when P = V (for 
the designated EU), it follows that 
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where V and Pare vectors and L is a matrix. By bounded rationality BR (and normal sign convention) 
Thus L is a positive definite matrix. 
Having said this, it is clear that L depends on the details of the transactional process. There 
is no other general restriction on L. However there are basically three different cases that are 
interesting to consider. The first case is rather hypothetical but worth describing: it is conceivable that 
the designated EU (knowing its own V and Z functions, and considering a range of possible prices P) 
attempts to reach the Pareto optimum by maximizing its Z-function in a single transaction. This 
program involves solving the following equations: 
It is important to note that the price-taker assumption is not essential here. Pairwise Pareto- 
optimum can be determined through the same scheme. Each of the two EU's solves equation (12) for 
its individual V function, for all possible market prices. For each price equation (12) yields a 
corresponding supply (demand) J. If  the exchange is between the a" and fl" economic units and if 
the commodity has a material nature, so that it obeys the general conservation of mass law, then 
In this case, the system is completely determined except for the dynamics of the approach to 
local equilibrium (or steady-state). In particular, the prices are determined from equations (10) and 
(13). Since the V function is derivable from the Z function, the latter in effect contains almost all the 
information needed to characterize the dynamics. The only missing information is the frequency and 
sequence of pairwise encounters between EU's. These data would have to be provided exogenously 
for any given system. 
The next case to be considered may be called the quasi-linear approach. Here we assume 
simple proportionality between demand and the difference between internal worth and exchange price. 
In this case the L-matrix does not depend on price. Now the flow J can be written as: 
If the off-diagonal elements of matrix L are zero, then one get a simpler formula 
Inserting i t  into (14) one gets 
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where 
The rate of change of the quantity of goods owned by the a th  EU is defined by the demand-supply 
vector 
Assuming that changes in the X-vector are small compared to the absolute magnitude of X, one can 
carry out a Taylor-series expansion for Z around its steady-state average (or equilibrium) value. When 
this is carried out to second order, one obtains a differential equation defining the time dependence 
of the system as follows: 
dxp a p a z a )  
- = c L ~  a v P a z P )  ax; 
dt pjk  a q  ax; flag 
The usual stability analyses can be applied8. In this case, note that the dynamics of the system are 
completely defined by the Z-function and the L-matrix. 
The third case differs from the first in that the path to steady-state or equilibrium is assumed 
to require a number of transactions, such that the price changes in any one exchange are small relative 
to the total change. Ditto the quantity exchanged at any one time is relatively small in the same sense. 
This case differs from the second case in two ways. First, the system is not restricted to small changes. 
Second, the system is not endogenously determined; that is, prices and quantities exchanged are 
determined by factors outside the system. In this case the rate of approach to steady-state or 
equilibrium is strongly affected by external constraints. 
To simulate the behavior of an economic system we have to define the agents (market, 
producers, (factories), consumers (humans, workers), their possible interactions, and their initial stocks 
(endowments) of goods and money. We must also specify their decision rules, beyond the simple 
requirement of bounded rationality. Agents can then be programmed to determine whether to do  o r ,  
not to undertake the possible activities. We also need further data and assumptions (e.g. parametric 
values) to fully specify the worth functions and the liquidity functions for a multi-good system 
(equations (8) and (9)). 
The explicit form of one simple form of Z is as follows 
8 If the Taylor expansion is taken to higher order, one can also derive equations with non-linear charaderistics, such as 
self-organization, analogous to the Belousov-Zhabotinski reactions, or the so-called Brussebor and Oregcmator systems. 
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where Xi is the i* extensive variable (commodity stock), M is the money stock, Vi is the internal worth 
of the good, and T is the liquidity of the EU [Ayres & Martinh, op cit]. For the sake of 
concreteness, we also note here the explicit forms for and T, namely 
and 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) yields the following convenient form: 
where the gi and ki are constants be determined9. Figure 1 shows the relationships graphically for a 
single EU and a single good X. Z is plotted in Fig la as a function of X for various endowments of 
money M, and in Fig lb  as a function of M for various endowments of X. T and V are plotted 
similarly in Figs lc  through If. Note that the logarithmic form has the property that ifX becomes large 
enough, V and Z become negative. (See, for instance, Figure Id). 
Another possible form for the Z function arises from the following choice for T, viz. 
This leads to the following form for Z, 
9 It has been emphasized several times that the explicit form shown here are wt unique. 'Ihe only requirement on T was 
where X is the weighted sum over goods. Then every function T of Ywith positive first derivative with resped to Y and negative 
second derivative with respect to M (e.g. P for 0 < q S 1) is also possible. 'Ihere are an infinite number of such functions. 
We can assume that econornic units that are distinguishable in sorne way, are also charaderized by different f m  of T (and 
a. 
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and the worth V becomes 
Figure 2 displays exactly comparable plots, for the same set of values of M and X. 
The interaction between two EU's, exchanging a single good for money is shown graphically 
in Figures 3,4 and 5. In Figure 3 we exhibit the relationship between supplyldemand and price for two 
different definitions of supply. In both cases price is assumed to be exogenously determined by an 
auctioneer and supplyldemand is computed for a number of different values of the original stock of 
the good, X. In the first (3a), the quantity of the good X that will be sold (i.e. the supply) or bought 
(i.e. the demand) is calculated by postulating a single transaction in which the equilibrium point is 
determined by the indifference condition that Z is the same before and after the transaction. It seems 
to confirm the classical assumption that supply increases monotonically with price. 
However Figure 3b  shows the results of a different calculation, with (perhaps) greater claim 
to realism: it assumes a sequence of exchange transactions limited to one unit of the good X per 
transaction, such that the sequence terminates only when Z is a maximum (i.e. the internal worth 
equals the price). In this second case it is interesting to note that, for large initial endowments and high 
enough prices, the supply actually declines slightly beyond a maximum. This is a theoretical prediction 
of the model. It reflects the fact that the internal worth of the remaining stock of the good increases 
sharply as the cash income of the EU (based on sales) grows lo. 
Figure 4 exhibits one version of the well-known Edgeworth Box. There is still only one good 
X, the total quantity of which is 200 units. Starting from any initial allocation of the good and money, 
the final equilibrium lies on the so-called contract curve, which lies near the diagonal of the box. In 
the case of indisti~zguishuble EU's (having the same form of Z function), the equilibrium states must 
be exactly on the diagonal. However, for purposes of illustration, we have chosen the more interesting 
case where one EU has the logarithmic form of Z-function (equation (23)), while the other has the 
square root form (equation (25)). Figures 4a-4d show the fine-structure of the Box. 
Figure 5 still refers to the Edgeworth Box, but for a different situation. Here the EU's are 
indistinguishable, with logarithmic Z-functions. The total quantity of the good X is still 200. It displays 
a variety of paths to equilibrium, for two different cases. In the first case (upper left hand comer), the 
path is plotted on the assumption that only a single unit of the good can be exchanged in one 
transaction. We have assumed a general price determination rule of the form P = a V, + (1 -a) V,. Re- 
sults are plotted for a range of values of a ,  from .001 to .032. In the second case (lower right hand 
side), a similar price rule is assumed, with the added complexity that exchange transactions begin with 
quantities of 20  units, and continue at that level until no further exchange of that magnitude was 
possible. The next attempt was at 10 units, and so on with successively smaller quantities being 
exchanged. 
'O As a e b l e  real wald example, in the earl: decades of the indwrial revolution factory m r s  often mplained that 
hired workers from peasant backgrounds often worked only long enough to earn enough cash f a  some particular purpose, at 
which point they would quit their jobs and return to their villages. This was distressing to faday owners, who axlld not count 
on a stable labor supply. A similar phenomenon is observed in parts of Africa today (where i t  is known as target fanning). 
During the early 1970's when the price of petroleum inaeased 5-fdd virtually overnight, some producers (in particular, Iran) 
began to consider cutting back on produdion. 
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Simulation of an ES with Production 
To simulate an ES including production as well as exchange processes we introduce a 
production vector. It describes what happens in the pk firm in an elementary step. In general, in the 
P" firm R(i,k) units of the Kh good are produced (R(i, k) > 0)  or consumed (R(i, k) < 0).  One explicit 
class of EU's consists of individual humans (workers/consumers). We assume that they eat, work, and 
collect durable goods with finite useful lifetimes. They sell their labor, if the price in the labor market 
is higher at the margin then the internal worth of leisure time. They buy food, until a specified maxi- 
mal food consumption level (fc) is reached. The quantity of durable goods (personal wealth) increases 
only by accumulation, but there is a spontaneous depreciation of 10% per period (dn = 0.9n). 
External assumptions: 
1. Money: the liquidity of each EU (?) is assumed to be constant in the market 
(another possibility is the bank system). 
2. Lvetime: the lifetime of all goods is ten cycles, with a depreciation rate of 10% per 
cycle. 
3. Labor: labor is purchased from worker/consumers by firms for one period at a time 
4. Inexhaustible resources: (for the sake of simplicity), except for food (agriculture), 
which is assumed to be based on a finite supply of land. Land can be bought 
and sold on the market. 
5. No explicit capital: Except for industrial goods (noted above) and land, there is no 
explicit capital (again, for the sake of simplicity). 
We have introduced four generic EU's in this simulation. They are as follows: (i) a trading 
company which buys and sells all goods fromfto other EU's; (ii) a farm, which buys durable goods 
and labor from the trader and sells food to the trader; (iii) a manufacturer, which buys agricultural raw 
materials and labor from the trader and sells durable goods to the trader; (iv) a worker/consumer, who 
buys food and goods from the trader, and sells labor to the trader. 
Results of the simulation are displayed in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9. In Figure 6a-6d the time 
dependence (up to 200 cycles) of the Z-functions for the worker/consumers and the two production 
firms (excluding the Trader) are displayed for various fixed values of the liquidity T, ranging from 0.5 
to 400. The results show generally increasing levels over time (cycles) as liquidity increases to 300; 
but surprisingly, the ES is unstable and fails to grow for T = 400. (This curious Tdependence 
behavior is shown more explicitly in Figures 7,8). Figure 7a-7d displays production and stocks of the 
two types of goods (food and durables) respectively. The same type of behavior occurs. 
Figures 8 and 9 display the same variables (goods output and stocks) at the end of 500 cycles, 
as an explicit function of liquidity. Figure 8a-8d assumes 100 worker/consumers in the system, while 
Figure 9a-9d assumes 30 worker/consumers. Otherwise the two cases are the same. The results are 
obviously qualitatively similar. 
It is clear that liquidity T dominates the functioning of the model ES as a whole. In cases 
where the liquidity is very low or very high, the model wonomy simply does not function, while there 
is a middle region characterized by prosperity generally increasing with liquidity. This result is 
counter-intuitive, but quite robust. It is in direct contradiction to the standard result of classical general 
equilibrium theory which asserts that the quantity of money in the system is not important. On the 
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other hand, it is consistent (in a general sense) with the main hypothesis of monetary theory. The latter 
has achieved fairly wide acceptance as a predictor of economic growth. 
We cannot yet assert that the observed behavior is characteristic of real economies, since we 
cannot really explain it. However, the result is sufficiently remarkable to suggest that economic 
theorists should focus much more attention to elucidating the underlying relationships between liquidity 
and economic growth. 
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